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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

further to Questions for Oral Answer B7-0010/2010 and B7-0009/2010

pursuant to Rule 115(5) of the Rules of Procedure

on the Non-proliferation Treaty

Pino Arlacchi, Annemie Neyts-Uyttebroeck, Andrew Duff
on behalf of the ALDE Group

B7-0143/2010

European Parliament resolution on the Non-proliferation Treaty

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the proposal for a recommendation to the Council by Annemie Neyts-Uyttebroeck, on behalf of the ALDE Group, and Angelika Beer, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, on non-proliferation and the future of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (B6-0421/2008),
- having regard to the forthcoming 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
- having regard to its previous resolutions of 26 February 2004¹, 10 March 2005², 17 November 2005³ and 14 March 2007⁴ on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament,
- having regard to its resolution of 5 June 2008 on implementation of the European Security Strategy and ESDP⁵,
- having regard to the EU strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003,
- having regard to the Council statement of 8 December 2008 on tighter international security, in particular points 6, 8 and 9 thereof, which expresses the EU's determination to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery,
- having regard to the pivotal role of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in the context of non-proliferation,
- having regard to UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
- having regard to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), which expired in 2009, and the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT),
- having regard to the report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy,

¹ OJ C 98 E, 23.4.2004, p. 152.

² OJ C 320 E, 15.12.2005, p. 253.

³ OJ C 280E, 18.11.2006, p. 453.

⁴ OJ C 301 E, 13.12.2007, p. 146.

⁵ Texts adopted, P6_TA(2008)0255.

endorsed by the European Council on 11 December 2008,

- having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A6-0234/2009),
 - having regard to Rules 115(5) and 110(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
- A. whereas the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, among both state and non-state actors, represents one of the most serious threats to international stability and security,
- B. whereas there has been a distinct lack of progress in achieving concrete objectives (such as the so-called ‘13 Practical Steps’¹) in pursuit of the goals of the NPT Treaty, as agreed at the previous review conferences, especially now that threats are arising from a variety of sources, including increasing proliferation; this is coupled with greater demand for, and availability of, nuclear technology, the potential for such technology and radioactive material to fall into the hands of criminal organisations and terrorists, and the reluctance of nuclear weapons states that are signatories to the NPT to reduce or eliminate their nuclear arsenals and decrease their adherence to a military doctrine of nuclear deterrence,
- C. whereas the NPT, as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime, must be strengthened, while bold political leadership and a number of progressive steps are urgently needed in order to reaffirm the validity of the NPT and reinforce the agreements, treaties and agencies that make up the existing proliferation and disarmament regime, in particular the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
- D. whereas there is a need further to reinforce all three pillars of the NPT, namely non-proliferation, disarmament and cooperation on the civilian use of nuclear energy,
- E. whereas the Commission enjoys observer status in the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the NPT review conference, and whereas the Council Secretariat is also involved in the NPT Conference, either within the Commission delegation or in conjunction with the EU Presidency,
- F. whereas the EU has committed itself to making use of all the instruments at its disposal to prevent, deter, halt and, if possible, eliminate proliferation programmes causing concern at global level, as clearly stated in the EU strategy against proliferation of WMD adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003,
- G. whereas there is a need for the EU to step up its efforts to counter proliferation flows and financing, to sanction acts of proliferation and to develop measures to prevent transfers of knowledge and know-how, using all means available, including multilateral treaties and verification mechanisms, national and internationally coordinated export controls, cooperative threat-reduction programmes and political and economic levers,
- H. whereas the EU has endorsed other non-proliferation and disarmament initiatives outside

¹ United Nations: 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II).

the UN framework, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the G8 World Partnership,

- I. whereas ‘non-proliferation clauses’ have become a general feature of agreements concluded between the EU and third states since 2003,
- J. whereas there is a need for close coordination and cooperation between the EU and its partners, in particular the United States and Russia, with a view to reviving and strengthening the non-proliferation regime,
- K. whereas President Barack Obama has made statements in which he underlined that the USA will strive for a world in which there are no nuclear weapons, work with Russia to take US and Russian ballistic missiles off hair-trigger alert, and dramatically reduce US stockpiles of nuclear weapons and material, and whereas US ratification of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreements is a positive, confidence-building step, as is President Obama’s intention to finalise US ratification of the CTBT,
- L. whereas new disarmament proposals called for by Henry Kissinger, George P. Shultz, William J. Perry and Sam Nunn in January 2007 and January 2008 and campaigns such as Global Zero argue that one crucial way of preventing nuclear proliferation and achieving global security is to move towards the elimination of nuclear weapons,
- M. welcoming, in this respect, the joint British-Norwegian initiative aimed at assessing the feasibility of, and establishing clear procedural steps for, the eventual dismantling of nuclear weapons and the related verification procedures; regarding this initiative as very positive for the EU, NATO and other relevant players,
- N. whereas in 2008 the French and British Governments announced reductions in their numbers of operational warheads,
 1. Stresses the need for the EU to do its utmost to achieve a nuclear weapon-free world within 10 years;
 2. Calls on all parties concerned to seize the opportunity of the forthcoming 2010 UN Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to advance the goal of complete nuclear disarmament based on an international treaty for the progressive elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide;
 3. Calls on the Council to contribute to such a treaty by: (a) prohibiting the development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, use and threatened use of nuclear weapons, and encouraging states possessing nuclear weapons – irrespective of whether or not they belong to the NPT regime – to take unilateral as well multilateral steps to achieve nuclear disarmament; and (b) prohibiting the production of weapons-usable fissile material and requiring weapons delivery vehicles to be destroyed or converted so that they are incompatible with the use of nuclear warheads;
 4. Stresses the need to develop strategies at the 2010 NPT review conference with the aim of achieving agreement on a treaty to halt, in a way that is not discriminatory, the production of fissile material for weapons purposes;

5. Repeats its call to review and update Council Common Position 2005/329/PESC of 25 April 2005 relating to the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons¹, in preparation for a successful outcome at the 2010 NPT review conference which will further strengthen all three existing pillars of the NPT;
6. Urges the Council to keep Parliament regularly informed of all preparatory meetings in the run-up to the 2010 NPT review conference, and duly to take into account its views on non-proliferation and disarmament matters in the context of that Conference;
7. Reiterates the importance of the Council's active support, in cooperation with its partners, for concrete proposals to bring the production, use and reprocessing of all nuclear fuel under the control of the IAEA, including the development of an international fuel bank; also supports other initiatives for the multilateralisation of the nuclear fuel cycle with a view to ensuring peaceful use of nuclear energy, bearing in mind that Parliament welcomes the readiness of the Council and the Commission to contribute up to EUR 25 million to the development of a nuclear fuel bank under IAEA control, and wishes to see the joint action in this area speedily approved;
8. Supports further efforts to strengthen the IAEA's mandate, including general application of the Additional Protocols to the IAEA Safeguard Agreements, and other steps designed to develop confidence-building measures and ensure that sufficient resources are made available to enable that organisation to fulfil its vital mandate to make nuclear activities safe;
9. Fully supports efforts to reinforce and improve means of verifying compliance with all available non-proliferation instruments;
10. Calls for efforts to be stepped up with a view to securing the universal application and effective implementation of non-proliferation rules and instruments, in particular by improving means of verification;
11. Requests an evaluation of the effectiveness of including clauses on non-proliferation of WMD in agreements concluded between the EU and third states;
12. Welcomes President Obama's announcement that he will take forward the ratification of the CTBT; calls on the Council to contribute positively and proactively to the preparations for the next NPT review conference in 2010, in close cooperation with the USA and Russia;
13. Takes note of the fact that the USA has abandoned its original plans for a missile defence shield in Europe; calls for a new global security architecture involving the EU, the USA, Russia and China in particular;

¹ OJ L 106, 27.4.2005, p. 32.

14. Calls for more in-depth dialogue with the new US administration and all nuclear weapons powers, with a view to pursuing a common agenda aimed at progressively reducing the stockpile of nuclear warheads; presses for ratification of the CTBT and renewal of the START agreement;
15. Welcomes, in this connection, the decision by the Russian Federation and the US to conduct negotiations with a view to concluding a new, comprehensive, legally binding agreement to replace START, which expired in December 2009, and the signing of the 'Joint understanding for a follow-on agreement to START-I' by Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitri Medvedev in Moscow on 6 July 2009;
16. Underlines that uncertainties about the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme are a serious threat to the non-proliferation system and stability in the region and the world; supports the objective of finding a negotiated solution with Iran, following the dual strategy of dialogue and sanctions, in coordination with other members of the Security Council and the IAEA;
17. Deplores the latest nuclear testing conducted by North Korea and its rejection of UN Security Council Resolution 1887 (2009) of 24 September 2009; nevertheless supports the US approach of bilateral dialogue, within the framework of the Six-Party Talks, with a view to bringing about the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula;
18. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the UN Secretary-General, the President of the 2010 NPT review conference and the Director General of the IAEA.